A note on the monotonicity and superadditivity of TU cooperative games by Caulier, Jean-François
A note on the monotonicity and superadditivity of TU
cooperative games
Jean-Franc¸ois Caulier
To cite this version:
Jean-Franc¸ois Caulier. A note on the monotonicity and superadditivity of TU cooperative
games. 2009. <hal-00633612>
HAL Id: hal-00633612
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00633612
Submitted on 19 Oct 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
A note on the monotonicity and
superadditivity of TU cooperative games∗
Jean-Franc¸ois Caulier
Faculte´s Universitaires Saint-Louis
43 Bd du jardin Botanique,1000 Bruxelles, Belgium
tel. : +32-2-211-79-44.
April 21, 2009
Abstract
In this note we make a comparison between the class of monotonic TU
cooperative games and the class of superadditive TU cooperative games.
We first provide the equivalence between a weakening of the class of su-
peradditive TU games and zero-monotonic TU games. Then, we show that
zero-monotonic TU games and monotonic TU games are different classes.
Finally, we show under which restrictions the classes of superadditive and
monotonic TU games can be related.
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1 Introduction
To the best of our knowledge, the general relationship between the class of mono-
tonic TU cooperative games (TU games for short) and the class of superadditive
TU games appears to be missing in the literature. Usually, cooperative games text-
books provide the definitions of both classes in sequence without any mention to
the conditions under which they can be related.1 Ignoring the (simple) conditions
under which one class is included in the other class mistakenly led some authors
to restrict redundantly the games they want to study to the class of monotonic
and superadditive TU games (e.g. see Laruelle and Valenciano [2] p.45). How-
ever, Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [3] (p.309) note that every superadditive TU
game is zero-monotonic. A TU game is zero-monotonic when the (unique) cor-
responding zero-normalized TU game (where the worth of any singleton is zero)
is monotonic. Other noticeable exceptions appear in Weber [7] who states that
no class contains the other one, and in Jaffray and Mongin [1] where they state
that if the TU game is everywhere non-negative, then the class of superadditive
TU games is contained in the class of monotonic TU games. But as far as we
know, no formal proof of these statements has been provided. In order to prove
these statements, we first define formally the classes under study and relate them
to derived concepts (weakly-superadditive and zero-monotonic TU games).
2 Notation and definitions
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair (N,v) where
N = {1, . . . ,n} is a finite set of players and v is a function associating a real value
v(S) to each subset S of N such that v( /0) = 0.
Each subset S of N is called a coalition and the set of possible coalitions on N
is denoted by 2N . The function v : 2N → R is called the characteristic function of
the game (N,v) and v(S) is the worth achieved by the members of coalition S in
the game (N,v). In TU games, the worth of a coalition can be redistributed among
its members in any possible way.
We denote by G N the set of possible TU games on N. A particular class of TU
games among G N is the class of superadditive TU games :
Definition 1. A TU game (N,v) is superadditive if and only if
v(S)+ v(T )≤ v(S∪T )
for any S ⊂ N, T ⊂ N and S∩T = /0.
1See Peleg and Sudho¨lter [6] and references therein.
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Alternatively (see Moulin [4]), take any collection S1, . . . ,SK of pairwise dis-
joint subsets of N whose union is N, then a game v is superadditive (or cohesive
in Osborne and Rubinstein [5]) if
K
∑
k=1
v(Sk)≤ v(N).
Intuitively, the condition of superadditivity states that players can collectively
achieve a higher value than in separated coalitions. This condition is reminis-
cent to increasing return of scales : two coalitions can jointly do at least as better
as they do separately.
We denote the set of superadditive TU games on N by G Ns .
Definition 2. A TU game (N,v) is monotonic if and only if S⊂ T ⇒ v(S)≤ v(T ),
for any S,T ⊂ N.
This condition simply states that the bigger the coalition, the higher its value.
We denote the set of monotonic TU games on N by G Nm .
It is quite easy to design an example of monotonic TU game which violates
superadditivity : the worth of any two distinct coalitions put together might be
greater than the worth of each coalition taken individually, but might be smaller
than the sum of their worths. Besides, the following example presents a superad-
ditive TU game violating monotonicity.
Example 1. Suppose that three individuals living in the same neighborhood want
to link up to the local sewer system. The linking cost for the citizen A alone is 1
whereas it is 5 for citizen B and 5 for citizen C. The cost of building and linking
up two neighbors is 6 and if the three neighbors are served collectively the cost is
7. Each citizen receives a state subsidy of 4 to link up to the sewer system. This
situation can be described by the following characteristic function :
v({A}) = 3,v({B}) = v({C}) =−1,
v({A,B}) = v({A,C}) = v({B,C}) = 2,
v({A,B,C}) = 5
Since v({A}) > v({A,B}), the game is not monotonic. Now, v({i}) + v({ j}) ≤
v({i, j}) for any i 6= j and v({i, j})+v({k})≤ v({A,B,C}) for any i 6= j 6= k, then
the game is superadditive.
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3 Classes of TU games related to superadditive TU
games
Definition 3. Let (N,v) be a TU game. We say that v is essential superadditive
if
v(S)≥∑
k
v(Sk)
for any S ⊂ N and (Sk)k any partition of S.
The idea of essential superadditivity (see e.g. Wooders [8]) is that “an option
open to a group of players is to cooperate only within elements of a partition of
the group.”
Definition 4. A TU game (N,v) is essential if
v(N)≥ ∑
i∈N
v({i}).
Note that the definition of essential TU games is built into the definition of
essential superadditivity by taking S = N and (Sk)k the singleton partition.
We denote the class of essential superadditive games on N by G Nes .
In the next proposition we show the equivalence between the concepts of es-
sential superadditivity and superadditivity.
Proposition 1. Let (N,v) be a TU game. Then (N,v) is superadditive if and only
if (N,v) is essential superadditive :
(N,v) ∈ G Nes ⇔ (N,v) ∈ G
N
s .
Proof.
1. We first prove that G Nes ⊂ G
N
s .
Suppose that (N,v) is essential superadditive. Define S = A∪B such that
A∩B = /0. Since {A,B} is a partition of S, by essential superadditivity we
have v(A)+ v(B)≤ v(S).
2. To prove that G Ns ⊂ G
N
es , we show that if (N,v) ∈ G
N
s , then (N,v) must be
in G Nes .
Suppose that (N,v) ∈ G Ns . Then for any S ⊂ N, v(A)+ v(B)≤ v(S) for any
A,B⊂ S, A∩B = /0 and A∪B = S. In the following we iterate the following
steps:
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Step 1: If (N,v) /∈ G Nes then there exists a partition {Sk}k∈K of S such that
v(S) < ∑k∈K v(Sk).
Step 2: Choose A,B⊂ S compatible with the partition, i.e. A∩B = /0, A∪B = S
and ⋃
k∈K′
Sk = A
⋃
k∈K′′
Sk = B
with K′∩K′′ = /0, K′∪K′′ = K. Then either
∑
k∈K′
v(Sk) > v(A) (1)
or
∑
k∈K′′
v(Sk) > v(B) (2)
Note that both (1) and (2) cannot be violated at the same time since
otherwise it would violate superadditivity.
Without loss of generality, suppose that equation (1) holds. We now
iterate the procedure and apply the step 1 to the set A.
Step 1: There exists a partition of A such that v(A) < ∑k∈K′′′ v(Ak). Such a
partition must exist by equation (1) (indeed take K′′′ = K′).
Step 2: Choose C,D⊂ A compatible with the partition {Ak}k∈K′′′ .
Continue the procedure until you find a set T such that in step 1 we have
v(T ) < v(T1)+ v(T2) with T1,T2 ⊂ T , T1∩T2 = /0 and T1∪T2 = T , contra-
dicting the superadditivity of (N,v). By the finiteness property of the player
set N, the procedure eventually stops after a finite number of iterations.
In some cases, we are interested in extending the class of superadditive TU
games by weakening the definition of superadditivity in the following way :
Definition 5. Let (N,v) be a TU game. Then (N,v) is weakly superadditive if
v(S)+ v({i})≤ v(S∪{i})
for all S ⊂ N \{i}.
We denote the class of weakly superadditive TU games on N by G Nws.
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Proposition 2. Let (N,v) be a TU game. Then
(N,v) ∈ G Ns ⇒ (N,v) ∈ G
N
ws.
Proof.
1. We can show directly that any superadditive TU game is also weakly super-
additive. Consider any (N,v) ∈ G Ns . Take S ⊂ N \{i}, then
v(S)+ v({i})≤ v(S∪{i})
which is the desired conclusion.
2. We now show that a TU game can be weakly superadditive while not being
superadditive. Consider N = {1,2,3,4} and v such that v({i}) = 0.1 for any
i ∈ N, v(S) = 1 for |S|= 2, v(S) = 1.2 for |S|= 3 and v(N) = 1.5.
Then for any S ⊂ N,
v(S)+ v({i})≤ v(S∪{i})
but v(S)+v(T ) > v(S∪T ) for any S,T ⊂N, S∩T = /0 such that |S|= |T |=
2.
4 Classes of TU games related tomonotonic TU games
In many applications of TU cooperative games, it is assumed that the worth achieved
by an isolated player is zero. By the following definition, we show that any TU
game (N,v) can be normalized such that the worth of any singleton is zero.
Definition 6. A TU game (N,v) is zero normalized if and only if
v(S) = v(S)−∑
i∈S
v({i})
for all S ⊂ N.
That is if v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Definition 7. A TU game (N,v) is zero-monotonic if and only if
v(S)+ ∑
i∈T\S
v({i})≤ v(T )
for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N.
5
That is (N,v) is zero-monotonic if its (unique) zero normalization is mono-
tonic : for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N, v(S)−∑i∈S v({i})≤ v(T )−∑i∈T v({i})
⇔ v(S)+ ∑
i∈T\S
v({i})≤ v(T ).
We denote the class of zero-monotonic TU games on N by G N0m. The next
proposition that shows that the classes of zero-monotonic and monotonic TU
games are not equivalent will be useful later in the study of the relationship be-
tween monotonic and superadditive TU games.
Proposition 3. The class of monotonic TU games (N,v) ∈ G N \G N0m and the class
of zero-monotonic TU games (N,v) ∈ G N \G Nm are non-empty.
Proof.
1. We first show the existence of zero-monotonic TU games that are not mono-
tonic. If (N,v) is not monotonic, then there exists S ⊂ N such that v(S) >
v(T ) for S ⊂ T ⊂ N. Suppose now that v(S)+∑i∈T\S v({i})≤ v(T ), then v
is zero-monotonic.
Example 2. Let N = {1,2}, and v be such that v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = −1
and v({1,2}) = 1.5.
2. We now provide an example of monotonic TU game which is not zero-
monotonic.
Example 3. Let N = {1,2,3}, and v be such that v({1})= v({2})= v({3})=
v({1,2}) = 1, v({1,3}) = v({2,3}) = 2 and v({1,2,3}) = 2.5. We can see
that v is monotonic. We now show that its zero-normalization is not mono-
tonic. Let w(S) = v(S)−∑i∈S v({i}). Then w({1}) = w({2}) = w({3}) = 0,
w({1,2}) = −1,v({1,3}) = v({2,3}) = 0 and v({1,2,3}) = −0.5, so that
w is not monotonic.
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We now state the perfect coincidence between the class of weakly superaddi-
tive TU games and zero-monotonic TU games.
Proposition 4. Let (N,v) be a TU game. Then, (N,v) is weakly superadditive if
and only if (N,v) is zero-monotonic.
Proof.
1. Consider (N,v) a zero-monotonic TU game. Take T = S∪{i} with S ∈ N \
{i}. Then v(S)+ v({i})≤ v(S∪{i}), establishing the weak-superadditivity
of v.
2. Now, let (N,v) be a weakly superadditive TU game. We want to prove that
for any S ⊂ N : v(S)+∑i∈T\S v({i})≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊂ T .
Suppose that S ⊂ T and let {i1, . . . , iK} be a sequence of players covering
T \S. By weak-superadditivity :
v(S)+ v({i1})≤ v(S∪{i1}).
By weak-superadditivity again,
v(S∪{i1})+ v({i2})≤ v(S∪{i1}∪{i2}).
Applying weak-superadditivity K−2 times :
v(S∪{i1, . . . , iK−1})+ v({iK})≤ v(T ).
Adding all these inequalities, we get
v(S)+
K
∑
k=1
v({ik})≤ v(T ).
Because the sequence {ik}
K
k=1 covering T \ S we have chosen is arbitrary,
we get the desired conclusion.
5 Relations between the classes of monotonic and
superadditive TU games
To show the general relationship between the class of monotonic TU games and
the class of superadditive TU games, the following proposition is useful.
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Proposition 5. If (N,v) is a superadditive TU game, then (N,v) is a zero-monotonic
TU game.
Proof. Combine Propositions 2 and 4.
Theorem 1. The classes of superadditive TU games (N,v) ∈ G N \ G Nm and of
monotonic TU games (N,v) ∈ G N \G Ns are non-empty.
Proof. Combine Propositions 3 and 5.
Despite the absence of general relationship between superadditive and mono-
tonic games, there exists a nice relationship between both classes if we restrain
the class of superadditive TU games to the class of nonnegative superadditive TU
games :
Proposition 6. If (N,v) is any nonnegative superadditive TU game then (N,v) is
a monotonic TU game.
Proof. Choose any TU game (N,v) ∈ G Ns such that v(S)≥ 0 for any S ⊂ N.
By superadditivity, v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ S) for any T,S such that S∩ T = /0. Since
S ⊂ T ∪S, it implies monotonicity. Hence G Ns ⊂ G
N
m .
To prove that the converse does not hold, it is sufficient to find an example of
monotonic TU game violating superadditivity : Choose N = {1,2,3} and v such
that v(S) = 1 for any S ⊂ N such that |S| = 1 , v(S) = 1.5 for any S ⊂ N such
that |S|= 2 and v(N) = 2.4. Then (N,v) is monotonic but not superadditive since
v({1})+ v({2,3}) = 2.5≥ 2.4.
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